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This article provides new empirical results regarding the demand for and supply of
title, the impact of title on land value, and its effects on agricultural investment on
Brazilian frontiers. We present survey data from 1992 and 1993 from the state of
Para on the characteristics of the settlers, land tenure, land agencies involved, land
values, and investment. We also present data from the Brazilian agricultural cen-
suses from 1940 through 1985, with observations at the municfpio (county) level to
examine the development of property rights to land in the southern state of Parana
during the agricultural boom between 1940 and 1970 and in the Amazon state of
Para during the period of rapid migration to the region after 1970. Examining prop-
erty rights in frontier regions allows us to follow the rise in land values with move-
ment toward a market center, the associated increase in demand for title, and the
response of government to those demands. The empirical findings generally sup-
port our predictions regarding the effects of title and investment on land value; the
role of expected change in value in increasing demand for title; and the contribu-
tion of title in promoting land-specific investment. Our results address both broad
questions of institutional change and narrower issues of economic development.
What I have done is to show the importance for the working of the economic
system of what may be termed the institutional structure of production.
—Ronald Coase (1992: 713).
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1. Introduction
Recent work in economics, law, and political science has directed attention to
the importance of a society's institutional structure in determining incentives
for economic behavior and performance.
1 Although much of the focus of this
literature has been on the firm and other organizational and political institutions
within developed economies, analyses increasingly have turned to questions of
economic development.
2 Indeed, the existence of property-rights institutions
and their impact on market expansion, investment, and resource use has become
a central issue in attempts to explain differences in economic growth.
3 Further,
the absence of well-defined property rights is cited as a key contributor to rapid
deforestation and other examples of "wasteful" land use in developing areas.
4
As a case in point, Brazil is the country most often cited for deforestation and
other alleged environmentally damaging actions in the Amazon, and unclear
property rights are suggested as a source of the problem.
5
Despite the importance of property-rights institutions as a basis for devel-
oping markets and encouraging long-term investment, more empirical work is
necessary to better understand the development of property rights, including
the supply of formal title by governments, the effects of title on asset values,
and the ways in which having title may change economic behavior.
6 Accord-
ingly, additional research on property-rights institutions addresses both broad
1. The literature is large and wide-ranging, and a few citations cannot do justice to the range
of work that exists. However, representative citations include the studies in Empirical Studies
in Institutional Change (Alston, Eggertsson, and North, 1996); the special issue of the Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Furubotn and Richter, 1993); the readings edited
by Williamson and Winter (1991); the articles on political organizations in the "Conference on
"The Organization of Political Institutions," special issue, 1990, Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization; as well as Becker (1983) and North (1990). Levy and Spiller (1994) use transaction
cost economics to analyze the determinants of performance of privatized utilities in five countries
where institutional conditions vary.
2. For example, see Ostrom (1990); Feder and Feeny (1991); Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz
(1993); and Besley (1994).
3. Recognition of the importance of property rights in economic behavior follows from the work
of Demsetz (1967), North (1981), Anderson and Hill (1975, 1991), and others. Barro (1991)
examines differences in property rights security in cross-country growth comparisons.
4. For discussion, see Berge, Ott, and Stenseth (1994); Gillis and Repetto (1989); and Deacon
(forthcoming-a, b).
5. See Binswanger (1989) and Mahar (1989).
6. For summary of the literature, see Eggertsson (1990). There have been analyses of property-
rights institutions both in contemporary developing areas and in an historical context. For analyses
in contemporary development, see Feder and Feeny (1991); Besley (1994); Ostrom (1990); Hazell
and Place (1993); Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel, and Place (1991); and Ensminger (1995). Besley
provides an analysis with respect to tenure and investment in Ghana. Feder and Onchan (1987)
and Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong, and Hongladrarom (1988) compare the performance of farmers
and land values on titled and nontitled land in Thailand. These studies examine the nature and
impact of tenure in more or less settled regions. Our analysis is of frontiers, allowing us to examine
the development of property institutions as land values rise. For more historical studies and
contemporary natural resource problems, see Libecap (1989) and Kantor (1995). Alston, Libecap,
and Mueller (1996) provide a discussion of property rights and violence in Brazil.The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights. Land Titles on the BraaBan Frontier 27
questions of institutional change and as well as narrower issues of economic
development.
In this article, we provide new empirical results regarding the demand for and
supply of title, the impact of title on land value, and its effects on agricultural
investment on Brazilian frontiers. For a micro analysis of the development
of property-rights institutions, we first present household data for 206 small
landholders from a survey conducted by the authors in 1992 and 1993 at four
frontier sites in the state of Pard. These data include the characteristics of
the settlers, the nature of their land tenure, the identity of the land agencies
involved, land values, and investment. To examine the development of property
rights over time and across a broader region, we use census data from the
Brazilian agricultural censuses from 1940 through 1985, with observations
at the municiipo (county) level. Specifically, we examine the emergence and
impact of land titles on two agricultural frontiers: in the southern state of Parana
during the agricultural boom between 1940 and 1970 and in the Amazon state of
Pard during the period of rapid migration to the region after 1970. By analyzing
census data across time, we can observe much greater variation in land value,
tenure, and investment than is possible with household survey data, which do
not exist over such a long time period or for comparable frontier regions. As
such, we can determine whether the development of property rights to land
changed over time as relative prices changed. If the results are similar for both
data sets, we can have greater confidence in the robustness of the tests of the
theoretical relationships between property rights and behavior.
In our analyses, the frontier is defined with respect to distance from a market
center and is the point where the net present value of land use just covers the
opportunity cost of the claimant. By examining the frontier, we can follow the
rise in land values as one moves toward a market center, the associated increase
in demand for title, and the response of government to those demands.
Although frontiers often are associated with the nineteenth century or earlier,
there have been significant migrations to previously-unoccupied land in the
twentieth century too. For example, there was rapid settlement of unoccupied
government land in the state of Parand after 1940. The population of the
state rose from approximately 1.2 million in 1940 to nearly 7 million by 1970.
Between 1940 and 1960, the amount of agricultural land almost doubled, and
the number of farms increased more than fourfold. Migration to the Brazilian
Amazon has occurred since the late 1960s, often through directed government
colonization projects. For example, the population of the state of Par£ in the
northeast Amazon grew from just over 2 million in 1970 to more than 4 million
in 1985.
7 The amount of land in farms doubled in the 1960s and again in
the 1970s, and the number of farms rose sharply. Beginning in earnest in the
1960s, new lands were opened for private claiming through construction of road
systems, such as the TransAmazon and Belem-Brasflia highways.
7. IBGE (Funda^aS Institute* de Geographia e Estatfstico, hereafter IBGE), Anudrio Estailstico
do Brasil (1990: 183; 1991: 180-83).28 The Journal ol Law, Economics, 4 Organization, V12N1
2. The Role of Title in Documenting Property Rights to Agricultural Land
Before describing the analytical framework and the data used in the analysis,
it is important to summarize the role of title to land in Brazil and the process
by which individuals can claim land and receive title to it. Title is a formal
document issued by the Brazilian federal government or by the state govern-
ment, depending on jurisdiction, that signifies government recognition of an
individual's property rights to land. Having a title not only gives legal stand-
ing to the landowner, but the recording of the title in the local land registry
(cartdrio) includes survey descriptions (memorial descritivo), the location of
boundary markers, and the date of recording to establish precedent for the land
claim. Land exchanges are recorded by the cartdrio in a document that in-
cludes a cadeia dominal, a list of previous owners. This record can be valuable
if there are disputes over land transfers. With title, the police power of the
state is used to enforce private property rights to land, according to surveyed
and recorded individual property boundaries. The courts issue eviction notices
or arbitrate boundary disputes, and law enforcement officials implement court
orders.
As the most visible form of ownership recognition by the government, having
title reduces private enforcement costs, provides security and collateral for long-
term investment in land improvements, and promotes the development of land
markets. All tfiese activities are wealth enhancing. The role of title in Brazilian
law is recognized throughout Brazil, and for the most part titles function well
and are respected.
Although frontiers by definition are remote, there are strong reasons to believe
that title on the frontier plays at least some of the roles described above. First,
consider the collateral argument. Even though credit may be quite limited on
a frontier, that is not the case for the rest of Brazil, where agricultural credit
has been commonplace and requires title. Migrants to the frontier, mostly from
rural areas, likely carry this understanding with them.
8 Settlers are aware that as
financial markets extend to the frontier, credit will become more available and
that having title will assist them in obtaining funds. Moreover, practically every
small urban center in Brazil has a branch of Banco do Brasil, which historically
has provided credit to agriculture. Further, living under inflationary conditions
of up to 50 percent a month has resulted in a population that is accustomed
to dealing with banks and other financial institutions in efforts to respond to
inflation.
The same arguments apply also to the role of title in promoting land ex-
changes. Throughout Brazil, title is a recognized institutional device for desig-
nating private property rights and facilitating land transfer agreements. Formal
titles are exchanged with land to document the transfer of ownership of land.
8. Certainly, those we interviewed stressed the role of title in enabling settlers to access capital
for investments. For example, 31 small landholders near the town of Tlicuma were asked in May
1993 what effect having title would have, and the dominant response (by 8 of those interviewed)
was that title would provide collateral to obtain credit These responses are representative of those
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Land exchange contracts and titles are recognized throughout the country and
are defendable in court. Hence, they provide security for those more remote,
potential purchasers (say, from more settled areas), who might be interested in
purchasing frontier land. Absent titles, individual holdings are based on squat-
ter claims and subject to local agreements and practices. Potential purchasers,
who are not part of such arrangements, may have little understanding of local
conditions or confidence in the property rights they provide. Although there
is a market for land without title, having title is perceived as an advantage by
settlers, as it broadens the range of potential purchasers.
9
Finally, consider the ability of title to reduce private enforcement costs. With
state-recognized title, landowners can appeal to the police to patrol property
boundaries and to evict trespassers. Further, the judicial system can be used
to issue injunctions against squatters who invade private property. A review
of land-conflict records held by the state land agency ITERPA (the State of
Parl Land Institute), the Parl Pastoral Land Commission (1989), and other
federal and state government agencies shows that having title facilitates the
introduction of the rule of law in resolving land disputes.
On Brazilian frontiers, government land (terra devoluta) is open for private
claiming and titling, much as it was in the United States in the nineteenth
century.
1
0 Generally, as with the U. S. Homestead Act of 1862, the land claim
must be occupied by the claimant and improved for agricultural use for a pre-
scribed amount of time—one year for claims on government land or five years
for claims to private land based on adverse possession. Once surveyed, land
claims are filed with government land agencies that monitor compliance with
the land laws, process title applications, and ultimately issue title.
To initiate the titling process, claimants generally must organize collectively,
travel to a local agency office, and formally request surveys and documentation
of their land claims. Group organization is necessary because land agencies
usually wait until a threshold number of requests are made before traveling to
the site. When they respond, agency officials take a census of settlers in the
area, survey and mark claims, and grant claimants an authorization to occupy,
9. Field notes by Ricardo Tarifa, May 18, 1993, indicate that between 40 and 50 percent of the
colonists in TucumS had sold land, even without title, between Tarifa's visits in 1991 and 1993.
The sales appeared to be to other colonists in the community. Similarly, in the community of Nova
Alianc,a, Tarifa noted active land exchanges among small landholders, none of whom had title.
Active land markets exist in all the survey sites.
10. In some cases, private land (generally on very large ranches) that is not put to beneficial use can
be invaded by squatters (posseims) and claimed by them. Forested land is particularly susceptible to
invasion by squatters because of the appearance of nonuse, the difficulty of monitoring occupancy
by squatters, and the attraction to itinerant loggers, who build roads to access valuable species
and thereby provide access for squatters. Where invasions occur, the government attempts to
enforce title for private land. If land is of low value, the formal owner may not object to the
invasion. Where land values are higher, however, owners will attempt to evict or to negotiate either
a voluntary exodus or a transfer to the squatters. The government may purchase the land from the
large landowner or negotiate payment from the landowner to the squatters for their improvements
and assist them in locating other lands for settlement. We are addressing this process in ongoing
research.30 "Hie Journal of Law, Economics, 4 Organization, VI2 N1
an authorizagdo do ocupagdo or licensa de ocupagao. The authorizations are
forwarded to the state or federal government, depending on the government
unit involved, for final recording. Normally, title applications can be processed
within two to five years, but if the initial claimant moves to a different site and
sells the claim, the title application must be reprocessed, extending the titling
time."
Within Parana\ the state government had jurisdiction over land settlement,
except in the western municfpios, where there was dispute over jurisdiction
between the federal and state governments (Foweraker, 1981: 88-92). This
conflict may have delayed the assignment of clear property rights to land and
encouraged conflict among settlers over claims (Westphalen, Machado, and
Balhana, 1968). We examine this issue in the empirical analysis below.
In some cases, particularly in Parana", private land companies obtained large
tracts of land from the state government, recruited settlers, and issued titles.
For example, the Companhia de Terras do Norte do Parana^ obtained 12,463
square kilometers of land in the north, sold urban and rural lots to settlers,
and extended railways and roads. The municfpios included in the company's
holdings accounted for more than 12 percent of the size of Parana" in I960.
1
2 Be-
cause the company gained clear legal title to its land before attracting colonists
and was a residual claimant in the titling process, it may have transferred ti-
tle more quickly and completely than did the state government (Nicholls and
Paiva, 1969: 27-30; Foweraker, 1981: 130). We also address this issue in the
empirical analysis below.
In Pari, government policy on the frontier has been different in a number of
ways from that in Parana^ which may have affected the titling process and hence
the results of the statistical tests presented in Section 6. First, in Pari both the
federal and state governments have been involved in titling.
1
3 In municfpios
with largely federal land, the federal land agency, INCRA (National Institute
for Colonization and Agrarian Reform), processed land claims, whereas in
munidpios with state lands, the state land agency, ITERPA, administered private
claims. Because ITERPA was subject to more local political pressures to assign
titles, it likely did so more rapidly and completely than did the federal agency,
INCRA. ITERPA processed title applications according to state election cycles,
with officials promising titles in exchange for electoral support (Pinto, 1980:
11. If the settler improves and occupies the land, agency officials will return and grant a provi-
sional title, while final title is being processed in Brasflia or Belem. If, when the agency returns
to the colony, the claimant has moved on or "sold" his squatter claim, the process of titling be-
gins again. The agency tends to acknowledge the new claimant who holds the authorization or
provisional title so long as the individual is a genuine settler and not a large land speculator.
12. This percentage was calculated using the map in Nicholls and Paiva (1969: 28) and the
area of the municfpios within the company's jurisdiction from IBGE, Anudrio Eslatislico do Brasil
(1965: 42^»3).
13. The federal government claimed that state lands were essential to national security. This
action was followed in 1971 by decree law 1164, by which the federal government took control
of all land up to 100 kilometers on either side of all roads constructed, under construction, or
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187). We can test for differences in titling across agencies in both the census
and survey data.
A second difference between the land claiming processes in Parana and Para
is that as land values rose in Parana private migration decisions drove claiming
activities, while in Para migration was stimulated by directed (subsidized) col-
onization programs of the federal government. Investment in infrastructure by
the federal government and subsidized colonies brought settlers to the Ama-
zon before land values had risen to a level that otherwise would have attracted
migrants.
1
4 Further, in Para declining budgets for land agencies limited their
ability to process title applications. Budget problems especially affected IN-
CRA, whose budget peaked in 1976, leading to a lag in the assignment of title
(Yokota, 1981: 33).
A third difference between settlement and titling in the two states is violent
conflict among competing claimants. Although there was confusion over prop-
erty rights to land in the western municfpios in Parana where the federal and
state governments competed for jurisdiction, in Par3 there has been violence
between small landholders and ranchers, particularly in southeastern Pard along
the Bel6m-Brasflia highway in the municfpio of Conceicao do Araguaia and
others near Marabi Ranchers have been subsidized by the Superintendency for
the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM), a federal agency that administered
a series of credit benefits and fiscal incentives (Schneider, 1994: 2-6), and
settlement by small landholders has been encouraged by investment in infras-
tructure by the federal government and by colonization projects organized by
INCRA. With the census data we can examine the effects on the titling process
of conflicting government jurisdiction in Paranci and violent conflict over land
in Para.
3. Analytical Framework
Figure 1 presents the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. In frontier
areas, distance to market is a primary determinant of land value. Transportation
14. Real land values in Par* in 1970 were less than half those in Parana in 1940 (in constant
1970 prices), and Parti land prices in 1980 remained less than half of ParanA land prices in 1950.
These data are from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses, Parana (1940: 244; 1950: 184); Parti
(1980: 282). The factors used in converting nominal prices to 1970 prices can be obtained from
the authors. Beginning in 1966 and continuing into the 1970s, the federal government provided
tax and credit incentives to private firms for investment in the Amazon. These initiatives were
joined in the early 1970s by road-building programs, pledges of other infrastructure investment,
and directed colonization efforts. INCRA organized colonization projects, especially along the
TransAmazon highway, bringing colonists from southern Brazil with pledges of infrastructure and
credit. In 1971, the Program for National Integration (PIN) was launched to bring colonists to the
Amazon. In Parti, INCRA established three colonization areas: Marabi, Altamira, and Itaituba. A
goal of placing 100,000 families, each with 100-hectare plots, in organized colonies and planned
urban centers was established, although not achieved (Fearnside, 1986: 19—20; Wood and Wilson,
1984: 142; Sawyer, 1984: 189). For an assessment of government settlement projects, see Moran
(1989b). In 1974, a policy shift led to greater emphasis on colonization by large ranchers in plots
of 500 to 3,000 hectares and less on small landholder settlement (Feamside, 1986: 21).32 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V12N1
Panel (a). Panel (b).
D Distance Distance
Figure 1. Analytical framework of analysis' (a) market value of titled and nontitled land,
(b) individual demand for title.
costs grow with distance from the market/administrative center, reducing the
net profitability of economic activities. At some distance, transportation costs
are high enough to make economic activity unfeasible, since the returns do
not cover the opportunity costs of the marginal laborer. Hence, the land is not
occupied and remains in forest. This land is beyond the economic frontier. This
discussion suggests that, all else constant, those who settle the frontier will be
those who have relatively lower opportunity costs, and limited education and
experience.
In Figure l(a), the horizontal axis represents the distance from the mar-
ket/administrative center, and the vertical axis reflects the market value of a
hectare of land; land is assumed to be homogeneous. Value is determined by
the production possibilities of the land, which are negatively related to distance
and positively related to inherent quality, land-specific investments, and market
exchange. Title also adds value to land. Formal, state-enforced title represents
the most secure form of property rights to land. Title signals government en-
dorsement of an individual's land claim; that is, with title, ownership is enforced
by the courts and the police power of the state. Under these circumstances, title
provides claimants with the long-term security of ownership and the collateral
necessary to access formal capital markets for land-specific investments. For-
mal, enforced title also reduces the private costs of defending claims, such as
private marking and patrolling of claims, because the state assumes many of
those responsibilities. Finally, by signaling government recognition of current
land ownership, a title increases the exchange value of land by widening the
market. Buyers from more distant areas, who may have more high-valued
uses for the land and access to capital markets, have the assurance that land
exchange contracts will be recognized by the courts and enforced by the state.
Absent title, land exchange occurs in more narrow markets, among local buyers
and sellers who are familiar with informal local property rights arrangements.The Detenrfnants and Impact of Property Rights. Land Titles on the BrazBan Frontier 33
These regional practices typically are not enforced by the courts or understood
by potential buyers from more distant areas.
1
5
In Figure l(a), the intercepts, V, and Vnl, reflect, respectively, the net present
values of land with or without title at the market center, point A. At the market
center, titled and nontitled land have different net present values because of
differences in productivity-enhancing investments, exchange possibilities, and
private enforcement costs. Indeed, at point A, where transportation costs are
the lowest, the contribution of title to land value is the greatest. Potentially
high-valued but nontitled land at the market center will be subject to more in-
tense competition, raising private enforcement costs and increasing uncertainty
of control. These conditions reduce investment, exchange, and production pos-
sibilities, thereby lowering potential land values. By contrast, with titled land,
the state assumes most of the enforcement costs, guarantees ownership, and
thereby promotes investment, exchange, and production. These activities raise
land values and shift the value from Vnl to V,.
Moving from the market center at point A toward the frontier, the contribution
of title declines. With higher transportation costs, land values are lower as the
potential for exchange and production declines. Competition for ownership
is reduced, requiring less state enforcement of title, and private enforcement
costs decline. Hence, the titled value line has a negative slope with respect to
distance, and the slope is steeper than that of the nontitled value line. At some
remote distance, D, the two value lines converge.
Figure l(b), illustrates individual demand for title. The vertical axis is the
difference between the values of titled and nontitled land, that is, V, — Vnl. This
difference reflects the added value of title to the individual claimant at different
distances from the market/administrative center. In the figure, the difference in
the land value with and without title declines with distance. Importantly, the
position of the curve may shift across individuals. Those with more education,
fanning experience, and wealth likely will receive higher added values of title
at any distance than will those with less human and physical capital because the
former may be able to take better advantage of the opportunities made possible
by title. We test for these effects below.
The private costs of obtaining title likely rise with distance, because claimants
must travel to the administrative center to record land claims and to file for title as
well as to lobby for titling services. Although, we do not have information on the
exact nature of the individual cost function, there will be a distance at which the
expected added benefits from having title are equal to the private costs for each
claimant of obtaining it. Beyond that point, individuals will hold their claims
as squatters, whereas at locations closer to the market/administrative center,
claimants will seek formal title. In Figure l(b) we represent this threshold
distance by point E.
15. In the nineteenth-century on the U.S. mining frontier, the need to obtain formal judicial
recognition of mineral claims was a major reason for the establishment of government institutions
(seeLibecap, 1978).34 The Journal o( Law, EconofTte, & Organization, V12 N1
The human and physical capital assets of claimants may lower the private
costs of obtaining title and thereby shift the position of point E. Claimants with
more education, wealth, and experience are more apt to know how to use the
bureaucracy to their advantage and to be able to lobby politicians to provide and
police land titles. In addition, government policy will affect the private costs
of obtaining title. Government policy determines who receives title (through
the allocation formula), when it is assigned (through marking and survey poli-
cies, pricing, and other settlement requirements), whether it is secure (through
enforcement practices), and how conflicts are adjudicated (through the police
and courts). Each of these is determined through the political process. Gov-
ernment may lower the private costs of obtaining title by subsidizing titles. For
example, politicians may travel to the site and exchange titles with farmers for
promises of electoral support. Alternatively, factors like the existence of multi-
ple land agencies, confused jurisdiction over government land, violent conflict,
and fluctuating agency budgets may delay the provision of tenure services and
raise the private costs to individual claimants. These conditions may shift point
E toward the market center, thereby delaying the assignment of title.
In Brazil, state and federal agencies have jurisdiction in different areas, have
different constituents, and have varying budget environments. State agencies,
in response to local constituent demands, may be more likely to subsidize
the private costs of obtaining title, whereas federal land agencies may be less
responsive to local demand and more vulnerable to changing national budget
priorities. Even in the absence of subsidies, it seems likely that it would be
more costly for local squatter organizations to effectively lobby politicians in
remote Brasflia, which is the nation's capital and headquarters for INCRA, than
in comparatively nearby Bele'm, the state capital for Para and headquarters for
the state land agency, ITERPA. Hence, the private costs of obtaining title from
state government land agencies may be less than those for obtaining title from
federal agencies.
Governments can transfer some of the costs of titling by selling land in
large blocks to private companies that in turn subdivide and title the land for
agricultural development, so long as government will recognize and enforce
the titles. Since private companies are residual claimants from land sales, they
may have more incentive than government officials to assign titles quickly and
at low cost to settlers. In Section 6, we test for these different effects that may
shift the costs of obtaining title and hence the threshold point E.
4. Characteristics of the Survey and Census Data
The analysis of the development and impact of property rights to land employs
two data sets: one from the authors' survey of 206 small landholders in four
sites in the state of Para, near the communities of Altamira, Tucuma, S3o
Felix, and Tailandia; the other from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses from
1940 through 1970 for ParanS and from 1970 through 1985 for Para.
1
6 The
16. Because of missing data, four observations are dropped, three from Altamira and one from
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Survey Sample (n = 206)
Variable
Land characteristics
Percentage of farmers with title
Value per hectare
Total distance to market (km)
Area (hectares)
Percentage of farm cleared
Percentage of farm in pasture
and permanent crops
Landholder characteristics
Education (years)
Time on plot (years)
Age (years)
Wealth (value of livestock)
Mean
61
$86.78
68.14
119.70
40.00
19.00
1.99
860
43.67
$3,651.20
Standard
Deviation
49
$200.95
57.70
261 82
24.00
19.00
2 21
7.32
13.01
$10,734.00
Minimum
—
$2.72
4.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
16.00
$0.00
Maximum
—
$1,902.00
190 00
3,500.00
100.00
100.00
10.00
58.00
78.00
$114,300.00
survey data allow us to examine the determinants of title, investment, and
land value at the individual level. The mix of sites allows us to analyze the
effects of different agency jurisdictions and settlement processes: Altamira, on
the TransAmazon highway, was one of the original planned colonization sites
by ENCRA; Tucuma was a private settlement area that reverted to INCRA's
jurisdiction after an invasion; and Sao Felix and Tailandia were settlement sites
organized by ITERPA. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the pooled
survey sample. Because of the large number of variables, we do not provide a
similar table of descriptive statistics for the census data.
1
7
The census data are by municfpio (county). In our data set, there are 79
municfpios in Para in the four census periods,
1
8 whereas in Parand the num-
ber of municfpios grows from 49 in 1940 to 288 by 1970, through subdivision
of existing municfpios. In general, the data are averages for each municfpio,
and they include average land value per hectare, distance from the municfpio
capita] to the state capital (Curitiba in Parana and Bele"m in Para) as a mea-
sure of remoteness from the market and administrative center, the proportion
of municfpio farmers with title, average farm size in the municfpio, average
soil quality for the municfpio, population density, and average investment per
hectare in the municfpio.
1
9 Analysis of these census data allows us to test for
the broad determinants of property rights to land as they emerge over time.
17. Descriptive statistics for both states for the eight census years can be obtained from the
authors.
18. For 1970 for Parf, we have only 78 municfpios because of problems with the census measure
of investment in one municfpio.
19. As we describe below, some of the variables, such as investment, are constructed using census
data. In all cases that involved prices it was necessary to deflate. All values for Parana are given
in 1970 cruzeiros and all values for Parf in 1985 cruzeiros. The index used to deflate prices was
the General Price Index calculated by Fundacao Getiilio Vargas. For the period 1940-1944, the
price index for Sao Paulo is that found in IBGE, Eslatlsticas Histdricas do Brasil, (1990: 226-36,
285-86).36 The Journal of Law, Economics, SOroarizaflon, V12N1
Before turning to the analysis, we describe each of the survey sites in order
to better understand the assignment of title and its possible effects. Settlement
along the TransAmazon highway running east from Altamira was to be a model
of organized colonization by the federal government, beginning in 1970 with
the first Plan for National Integration (PIN).
2
0 PIN called for construction of
the TransAmazon and other regional highways and for colonization of lands
made accessible by new roads. A 10 kilometer strip of land on either side of the
highway was set aside for small fanners, who could receive up to 100-hectare
plots. Infrastructure was to be provided. By the late 1970s, however, federal
priorities had changed, and far fewer settlers were brought to the region than
was originally planned (Butler, 1985). Nevertheless, individual settlement did
occur at intervals along the highway, running east from the city of Altamira
and along rough side roads that were constructed by logging companies. Many
of those roads extended 30 to 60 kilometers from the TransAmazon highway,
some as far as 120 kilometers.
The sample includes 47 farmers, scattered along the TransAmazon highway
and side roads at intervals of 18,27,55,105, and 160 kilometers from Altamira,
a city of 20,000 to 30,000 people.
2
1 These interview points were based on the
existence of farms and feeder roads along the TransAmazon. This procedure
was used to capture the effect of distance from the market as a major determinant
of land value, titling, and investment Mean farm size in our sample is 132
hectares, with 10 hectares the minimum and 600 the maximum. Eighty-two
percent of the farmers have title to their land. By 1993, farmers had been on
their plots for 15 years on average, suggesting that most arrived during the
directed colonization period in the mid-1970s. Mean reported land value per
hectare is $60. INCRA was to provide settlers with title within two to five years
of settlement, but after 1976, due to declining budgets, the agency processed
applications more slowly (Moran, 1984: 291). Altamira is used as the baseline
in the pooled regressions of survey data reported below.
Another INCRA site is near TucumiL, which began as a private coloniza-
tion effort by CONSAG (Construtora Andrade Gutierrez), a large private con-
struction firm that built highway PA-270 to link the area with PA-150 and
the Beldm-Brasflia highway (Butler, 1985). CONSAG recruited farmers from
southern Brazil, beginning in 1981. After invasion of unoccupied areas in 1985,
the company abandoned the project, and it eventually reverted to INCRA. Our
sample includes 54 small farmers chosen randomly at various distances along
two roads from the community of Tucum§, which has 5,000 to 10,000 peo-
ple. Mean distance from Tucum2 is 26 kilometers. Thirty-two percent of the
farmers in the sample have title, with the remainder occupying their claims as
squatters. Mean farm size is 94 hectares, and mean per hectare farm value is
$237. On average settlers have been on site for five years.
The third site is administered by ITERPA along state highway PA-150 from
20. See Moran (1984: 287), Feamside (1986), and Schmink and Wood (1992: 70).
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the market town of Tail§ndia. Tail&ndia is a community of approximately 10,000
people, 200 kilometers south of Bel6m. PA-150 was built in the mid-1970s and
asphalted in 1985 as a major road for linking Bele"m with mineral deposits in
southern Parl The colony was established in 1978 when ITERPA awarded 50-
hectare plots to settlers in an area 3 to 8 kilometers on each side of the highway,
for approximately 150 kilometers from TailSndia. We selected this site and
one other to see whether jurisdiction differences among land agencies with
different constituents and funding conditions would have an impact on titling.
The sample includes 59 small farmers along PA-150. The mean distance from
Tailandia is 45 kilometers. Of the 59 small landholders in Tail§ndia in our
sample, 71 percent have title. Mean farm value per hectare is $24 with mean
size of farm 78 hectares. On average, farmers had been on their plot for eight
years.
The next ITERPA site is near the community of SSo Felix, with fewer than
7,000 people in the area.
2
2 SSo Felix is a very small town with little infras-
tructure, and the ITERPA colony stretches 35 kilometers along the Xingu river.
The closest market town is Tucum2. We surveyed 46 small landholders at two
sites, one 45 minutes down river at a colony, Santa Rosa, and another five hours
up river at Chadazinho. ITERPA has been active in assigning title in the area.
Fifty-nine percent of those interviewed have title to their claims. Average value
of land is $ 16 per hectare, the lowest of the interview sites, mean distance to
market is 153 kilometers, the furthest for the survey. The settlers' mean time
on the plot is 6 years.
5. Estimation
The analytical framework suggests the following system of equations for an-
alyzing the determinants of land value, title, and investment on the frontier.
These equations make use of the variables available to us in the Brazilian cen-
sus and in our survey. For the estimations based on census data, we use OLS
(ordinary least squares) and a log-linear specification for the land value and
investment equations.
2
3 For those based on survey data, we use a log-linear
22. Field notes by Ricardo Tarifa, May 31, 1993, and the IBGE 1985 Census.
23. To decide whether to use a linear or log-linear specification for the value of land and investment
equations in the four census periods in each state and for the survey data, we performed a test
proposed by Davidson and Mackinnon (1981). Of the 8 equations estimated for each state, the test
either led to the rejection of the linear specification (9 of the 16 estimations) or was inconclusive
regarding the use of the linear or log-linear specification (5 of the 16 estimations). In only two
cases (one in each state) was the log-linear specification rejected. We used the procedure outlined
by Breusch and Pagan (1979) to test for heteroskedasticity in the census estimations and corrected
for it as necessary. Where heteroskedasticity was found, the estimation was corrected by using
White's (1980) consistent estimator of the covariance matrix. The problem was greatest in the
Parand estimations, where 10 of the 12 runs required correction. For the Part estimations, only 3 of
the 12 runs required correction, 2 in the early value runs and 1 in the early investment estimation.
The title equation for the census data, where the proportion of municfpio fanners with title is the
dependent variable, was estimated using a Probit specification. The results were essentially the
same as with OLS, so we chose the OLS specification to make coefficient interpretation easier. In
Par£, the municfpios of Belim, Ananindeua, and Benevides were not used in the analysis because38 The Journal oi Law, Economics, & Organization, V12N1
specification and OLS for the land value equation, Tobit for the investment
equation, and Probit for the title equation (because title is a binary variable). In
all'these equations, e represents an error term.
In Value = a\ + a2 In Distance +03 In Title • Distance +a4 In Soil
+ a$ In Clear +a^ In Investment +aj In Density +ag Title
+ ag Jurisdiction +a\o Conflict +e (1)
Title = b\ +b2 Change in Value +b^ Size +b4 Jurisdiction +fc5 Conflict
+ b(, Distance +bj Characteristics +e (2)
In Investment = d\ + di In Distance +di Title +d* In Soil
+ ds In Characteristics +d$ Jurisdiction +dj Conflict +e (3)
As shown in Equation (1), having title increases land value, and hence, should
affect the demand for title, as reflected in Equation (2) through the change-in-
value variable. This variable, however, is not directly observable in either of
our data sets. Accordingly, we introduce a constructed variable for the expected
change-in-value from having title, calculated from Equation (1): we take the
difference in the antilogs of the Value equation when Title equals one and zero,
and this expression contains both exogenous variables and investment. Because
of simultaneity between title and investment, we use a two-stage procedure
to estimate those variables.
2
4 Predicted investment is used to calculate the
change-in-value variable, and predicted title is used to estimate investment in
Equation (3). The two-stage procedure addresses possible correlation of the
errors in the investment and title equations. Because title and investment are
both in the value equation, there is the possibility of correlated shocks across
the equations; accordingly, we performed the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test
for correlation in the error terms in all three equations and found none.
2
5 Based
on these results, estimating the land value equation with OLS yields consistent
results.
5.1 Land Value
The rationale behind Equation (1) is as follows: Land is an input to agricul-
tural production. Its derived value is a function of supply factors, primarily
the amount of available land, and demand factors, which include population
they are primarily urban areas.
24. The two-stage procedure introduces the problem of biased standard errors. Where we
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) consistent estimator of the covariance matrix,
the problem is addressed. However, where no heteroskedasticity existed, we adjusted the standard
errors following Kclejian and Oates(198l: 248-49).
25. The Breusch and Pagan (1980) technique involves a Lagrange multiplier test for correlation
between the error terms of the model equations. The chi-square statistics for Para and Parana were
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density, agricultural productivity, the net prices of agricultural output (gross
agricultural prices less transportation costs), and the nature of property rights
to land. Productivity is determined by soil quality (inherent land productivity),
past investment in improvements, and other characteristics such as land con-
tours, access to water or irrigation, and the degree to which the land has been
cleared of forest, which is a precondition for most agricultural activity. The
effect of clearing on land value depends upon whether forests were considered
valuable (Parana) or an impediment to farming (ParS).
Having title should increase demand and, hence, land values by reducing
private enforcement costs, promoting investment, and expanding market ex-
change. Greater distance between the market center and the frontier should
reduce demand and land values per hectare, because of increased transporta-
tion costs and lower net returns to farming. As illustrated in Figure l(a), the
effect of distance is different for titled and nontitled land. Up to some remote
point, distance should have a greater negative effect on the value of titled land
than on the value of nontitled land because of the contribution of title to value
declines as the distance from the market center increases.
Accordingly, the estimated Equation (1) using the survey data contains the
following variables. Value is the reported per-hectare value of a settler's farm.
2
6
Site dummies for S£o Felix, TailSndia, and Tucuma relative to the baseline of
Altamira are included to account for the impact on land value of differences
in soil quality or other site-specific variables, such as agency jurisdiction, that
would affect the demand for land. We do not have information about differences
in soil quality along the roads within each of the four sites where we interviewed.
There are no indications, however, that soil quality differs importantly within
each site. We include other demand variables—the extent of forest clearing,
land-specific investment, the existence of title, and distance from the market
center. Distance is reflected in two variables. The distance variable accounts for
the expected negative effect that distance from the market center has on land
values. The title-distance interaction variable reveals the effect that having
title has on land value with respect to distance. The distance variable reflects
the additional effect of distance on the value of nontitled land. Hence, we
expect both coefficients to be negative, making the slope for the estimated line
describing the value of the titled land larger in an absolute sense. The cleared-
land variable is the percentage of the farm that is cleared of forest. Investment
is the percentage of the farm that is placed in pasture or permanent crops; this
variable should capture the effect of past improvements on land value, leaving
the exchange and enforcement effects on land value to be captured by the title
variable.
The estimation of Equation (1) using the census data contains the following
variables: the value of agricultural land per hectare in the municfpio as the
26. Although the land prices are those reported by individual farmers and are not actual trans-
actions, there are active land markets in all four sites; hence, individuals would have opportunities
to observe actual sales prices of nearby farms.40 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V12N1
dependent variable;
2
7 the percentage of municfpio farmers who hold title to their
land;
2
8 land-specific investment per hectare in the municfpio as of the census
year;
2
9 distance from the municfpio capital to the state market center,
3
0 average
soil quality in the municfpio;
3
1 the percent of municfpio agricultural land that is
cleared of forest;
3
2 municfpio population density; whether the municfpio was
administered by a private land company or whether it was one of the municfpios
contested between the state and federal governments (Parang); whether the
municfpio was administered by INCRA or whether the municfpio was the site
of conflict over land (Para); and the effects of distance from the market center
on titled and untitled land values, introduced through an interaction term for
distance and title.
We discuss the role of private land companies in the settlement of Parand
below. Here we use dummy variables for the northern municfpios that were
under the jurisdiction of the most important private land company, Companhia
de Terras do Norte do Parana, to test whether the company was granted the
27. Land values for 1940-1980 are from the Brazilian Agricultural Censuses, published by
FBGE. The values arc those declared by the proprietor or administrator of the farm to the census
interviewer. The agricultural census is done over the universe of agricultural establishments in each
state and the results are presented aggregated at the municfpio or county level. The value of land
in 1985 in Parf was not provided in the census. It was estimated by first calculating the ratio of
land value to the value of farms (which included the value of investments, machinery, and animals)
for 1970, 1975, and 1980. The growth rates of this ratio were obtained and an average growth rate
calculated. The 1980 ratio was then multiplied by this average growth rate to give the 1985 ratio,
which in turn was multiplied by the 1985 agricultural farm value as provided in the census.
28. The census provides the proportion of municfpio farmers who occupy their land without title
(squatters). Hence, our measure is one minus the proportion of farmers who are squatters.
29. In Section 5.3, we describe how the investment variable was created from the census data.
30. The distance between the municfpio capital and the state capital was calculated using
maps. For Parti, the data are provided in a map, Republica Federative! do BrasiU Estado do
Pard, Rodoviario, Politico e Estatistico, 3d ed., 1988, published by Editora Turistica e Estatistica
Ltda, Goiania. The data are from DER (Deparlamento Estadual dc Rodagem) and from DETRAN
(Departamento Nacional de Transito), respectively the state and national highway agencies. In
Parti, the distances given are to Betem. Because of the importance of river transport in Parri, we
used distance by river if this was less than the distance by road or if no roads existed. For Paranft, the
distance variable was created from a map prepared by the state of Parand road department (DER)
in 1966. The distances given are to Curitiba, the capital of the state, even though some municfpios
in the north of Parana probably are more under the influence of the markets in Sao Paulo, which is
closer. Lacking more complete information, we maintained the same market for all the municfpios
in Parana.
31. Soil quality for each municfpio was constructed using the maps in Geografia do Brasil, Regiao
Sul (vol. 2, p. 133) and Regiao Norte (vol. 5, pp. 90-91), published by IBGE, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.
The maps classify the potentiality of the soil for agriculture in five categories, considering fertility
and topography. Each municfpio was assigned a number ranging from 1 to 5, increasing with the
quality of the soil's potential.
32. The cleared-land variable was constructed by dividing the number of hectares of agricultural
land cleared by the total amount of agricultural land in the municfpio. The area cleared was defined
as the sum of the land in permanent crops, temporary (annual) crops, planted pasture, natural
pasture, planted forest, and unused but usable land. These variables are defined by the agriculturalThe Determinants and Impart of Property Rights: Land Tines on the BrazEan Frontier 41
most valuable land or whether it added extra infrastructure.
3
3 Additionally, we
test whether conflict over land lowered values in those western municfpios in
Paran£ that were characterized by jurisdictional disputes between the state and
federal governments.
3
4
We test for similar jurisdictional and conflict effects in Para". Private land
companies were much less important in the settlement of Para\ but the federal
government may have claimed the best land along major highways and assigned
the land to its agency INCRA. We assign a dummy variable for those municfpios
under INCRA's jurisdiction.
3
5 As in Parana\ we expect that conflict over land
would reduce land values. In the late 1970s and 1980s there was conflict in 44
of the 79 municfpios in our data set (Part Pastoral Land Commission, 1989),
especially in the southeastern part of Para\ For those municfpios we assign a
dummy variable with the value of one. We do not have data on conflict for 1970
and 1975, although disputes likely were more limited at that time because of
the early stage of settlement.
5.2 Title
Equation (2) contains both demand and cost variables for title as suggested by
the analytical framework in Figure l(b). For the survey data, the dependent
variable is a dichotomous variable, taking the value one if the farmer had title
and zero otherwise. For the census data, the dependent variable is the percentage
of municfpio farmers who hold title to their land. In general, the demand for
title should be a function of expected private net returns, which in turn are due
to the increase in land value from having title less the private costs of obtaining
title. Land values will increase with title because of a greater opportunity
for investment in land improvements, greater exchange opportunities for land
sales, and reduced private enforcement costs. The private costs of securing
title, and hence demand, also will be affected by the requirements of the land
33. The dummy variable for the municfpios in which Companhia de Terras do None do Parana
allocated land was created using the map in Nicholls and Paiva (1969: 28). By examining IBGE
maps (DT-SUEGE DEGEO/DIATA) that designate municfpios, it is possible to identify which
municfpios are included in the company's holdings. These areas then can be projected forward to
1970 and extended back to 1950 and 1940 to identify the municfpios involved.
34. Determination of whether a municfpio was involved in government jurisdictional disputes
is based on discussion of Parang settlement in Westphalen, Machado, and Balhana (1968). These
authors clearly define 11 municfpios where there were disputes in the 1950s between the federal
and state governments. They also indicate that such conflicts were long-standing and not settled
until the mid-1960s, although they do not identify the contested municfpios in earlier or later years.
Due to subdivision, the number of municfpios in Parana grew over time. In the estimation, we
traced the municfpios as identified in the 1960 census back to 1950 and 1940 and extended them
forward to 1970. Of the 49 municfpios that existed in 1940, 1 was classified as private and 3 as
having jurisdictional conflict. In 1950, of 80 municfpios, 8 were private and 4 were in the disputed
area. In I960, there were 162 municfpios in Parana, with 29 having private land company holdings
and 11 being in the disputed area. By 1970, there were 288 municfpios, with 49 having large private
company holdings and 61 being within the area of jurisdiction confusion.
35. According to Brazilian law, municfpios were considered as being under INCRA's jurisdiction
if the capital of the municfpio was within 100 km of a federal highway.42 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V12N1
laws, such as beneficial use, occupation, boundary marking, and documentation.
Unfortunately, we do not have systematic census or survey data on these factors.
Additionally, costs will be an increasing function of distance due to the higher
costs of traveling to and from remote farm sites to the administrative center and
surveying and recording claims.
For the survey data we have the distance in kilometers from each farm to
the local community and land office site, which is the city of Altamira for the
Altamira colony, the city of Tucuma for the TucumS and Sao Felix colonies,
and the city of Taila^idia for the Tail&ndia colony. For the census data, we have
evidence on the distance from the municfpio capital to the main administrative
center, which is the state capital (Curitiba in Parang or Bele"m in Pard). Other
demand variables, for which we have some data include the size of the farm
(average farm size in the municfpio for the census), the characteristics of the
individual farmer, and the expected change in land value from having title.
Because private enforcement costs are likely to be higher for large farms or
ranches, we expect that larger average farm sizes would increase the demand
for title, hence the sign of the coefficient is anticipated to be positive. Although
we test for the effects of farm size in the estimation that uses census data, we
do not include farm size in the demand for title in the estimation using the
survey data because the sampled farms are all uniformly small. Both formal
colonization projects for small farmers and invasions by squatters of a particular
area lead to a clustering of small farms in the Amazon with few neighboring
large farms or ranches.
3
6 For example, the four sites we sampled are made up
almost totally of small landholders: 80 percent of the 206 farmers in the survey
had less than 100 hectares, and 93 percent had less than 200 hectares. Among
small landholders in the Amazon there is comparatively little conflict. In our
survey, small farmers repeatedly stated that their claims were "safe," indicating
that there were few private enforcement costs that would differ by farm size.
There are several reasons why there are few disputes over land claims among
small holders (small landholders). One is that the land is in beneficial use.
Landholders with 200 hectares or less use much of their land to earn a nearly
subsistence living for their families. Their plots are either in full production or
are gradually being cleared at a rate of three to five hectares per year.
3
7 Further,
since small farmers typically occupy their land, they can observe intrusion by
neighbors or other squatters on their small holdings. Land claims are marked
with cleared boundaries and planted trees, often cashews. Finally, small holders
in an area organize groups to lobby the local land offices to provide formal
36. Although this is the general case in Parf, there are a few municfpios where federal subsidies
for ranching under SUDAM were also attractive for squatting. These areas are characterized by
both large ranchers and small landholders, and these counties, not surprisingly, are where violence
occurs. See Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (1996). These municfpios are included in the estimations
based on census data.
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titles.
3
8 These collective actions create a sense of cohesion or community
among small holders that promotes recognition of individual land claims.
3
9
There are occasional disputes between adjacent small holders over the location
of boundary lines or the drift of cattle and between small holders and loggers,
who trespass to harvest valuable timber species. Both our survey responses
and the land dispute records of FTERPA and the Pastoral Land Commission
in Brasflia, however, clearly indicate that disagreements among small holders
over property rights are resolved routinely.
With regard to individual characteristics, the survey data include each land-
holder's time on the plot, age, education, and wealth (value of livestock). The
census data include the average age, income, and education in the municfpio for
the 1980 census year only.
4
0 As proxies for experience, education, and income
or wealth, age and time on the farm could both increase the demand for title
and reduce the private costs of obtaining title. Individuals with greater experi-
ence, education, and income or wealth may be better able to take advantage of
having title and to realize the extra returns made possible by it, and they may
understand better the political process and bureaucratic requirements, enabling
them to secure title at lower private cost.
4
1 Hence, the estimated coefficients
on these characteristics variables should be positive.
The final demand variable is the expected change in value from having title.
The change in land value from having title should affect the individual demand
for title, as indicated in Figure 1 (b). We have no direct evidence for this variable
for either the census or the survey estimations, and construct the change-in-value
variable from Equation (1) as described above.
The cost of obtaining title will also be affected by jurisdictional issues, which
in terms of Figure l(b) would be shown by shifts in the threshold distance E.
For the survey estimations, the jurisdictional effects are represented with site
dummy variables to capture agency and other site-specific factors that might
affect the private cost of title. The site variables represent shifts with respect
to Altamira, the baseline. We chose Altamira as the baseline because it was a
showcase INCRA settlement. An early colonization site along the TransAma-
zon highway, Altamira was established when INCRA had large budgets that
38. The role of sindicatos and church groups in squatter efforts in the Amazon are well known.
Similar activities were undertaken by local claims clubs in the U.S. in the nineteenth century.
39. A discussion of local "networks" and corresponding recognition of individual land claims
is provided in Ricardo Tarifa's field notes, May 18, 1993, for Tucuirai. For a discussion of local
enforcement of property rights in a different context, see Ellickson (1991).
40. Before 1980, socioeconomic data are presented at the state level only, not by municfpio.
41. We considered whether cleared land was an explanatory variable that affects the costs of
obtaining title. The farmers we surveyed in ParS indicated that having title had little impact on
their clearing activity. Additionally, they claimed that clearing did not promote title. According
to them, in a densely forested region such as the Amazon, everyone must clear as a precondition
to engaging in any agricultural activity. Including clearing as an explanatory variable in the title
equation revealed no significant impact, nor did title have a significant impact on clearing. With
regard to the wealth variable, ideally, a wealth measure would include other assets, but we do not
have such data. Moreover, among frontier settlers with few assets, livestock are an important source
of wealth.44 The JoumeJoJ Law, EconomKS, 4 Organization, V12N1
allowed it to provide title at low private cost, so we expect that settlers close to
the market will have title in that colony. Tucuma is another INCRA site, but
it was placed under the agency's jurisdiction late, after budgets had declined,
reducing INCRA's capability to process titles; this factor may have raised the
private costs of obtaining title in that colony. Landholders in the ITERPA ar-
eas of Tailandia and Sao Felix may be more likely to have titles than those at
Altamira, because of the aggressive actions of ITERPA to subsidize the provi-
sion of titles to small holders in exchange for political support and the closer
proximity of ITERPA headquarters in Bele"m.
For the census estimations, we include dummy variables for the western mu-
nicfpios in Parana, where there were conflicts between the state and federal
government over which government had authority to grant title. This factor
likely would raise the private costs of obtaining title and should lead to a neg-
ative estimated coefficient for the government dispute variable. In addition, in
ParanS private land companies played an important role in settlement and the
provision of title. Because the private land companies were residual claimants
for increases in land value from providing title, we anticipate that they would
provide title at lower cost to claimants. Hence, those municfpios under private-
company jurisdiction would have more titles, on average, leading us to predict
a positive coefficient for the jurisdiction variable in Parana. In the census es-
timations, the northern municfpios under the jurisdiction of the private land
company, Companhia de Terras do Norte do Parana, are indicated with dummy
variables.
For the census estimations in Para\ we add two variables. One is also a
jurisdictional dummy variable. Private land companies have been less impor-
tant in that state, but, as described above, the federal and state governments
had different land agencies (INCRA and ITERPA, respectively), which had
separate jurisdictions. We expect that the state agency, ITERPA, with local
constituencies and headquarters in nearby Bele"m would be more responsive to
local demands for title and would provide title at comparatively lower private
cost. Accordingly, the municfpios under ITERPA's jurisdiction would be titled
more extensively than would those under the federal agency, INCRA, which
had national constituencies and was headquartered in more distant Brasilia.
In the equation, INCRA municfpios are represented with a dummy variable
with a value of one, zero otherwise. As a result, the estimated coefficient on
the INCRA variable is predicted to be negative. The second variable, violent
conflicts, is used to identify those municfpios in Par£ characterized by violent
conflict over land between ranchers and squatters. We view this conflict as a
demand variable, because the returns to secure title would be particularly large
in areas where ownership was uncertain. Accordingly, we anticipate a positive
coefficient for the violence variable.
5.3 Land-specific Investment
The rationale for Equation (3) is as follows: investments in land improvements
will be made on the basis of expected returns, which in turn are a function of the
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investment. For the survey estimations, investment is measured as the portion
of the farm placed in improved pasture and permanent crops. Preparing pasture
and planting permanent crops—such as cacao, coffee, pepper, and citrus—
represent the most important investments made by the small holders in our
sample. Most costs are labor devoted to improving pasture (building fences,
chopping brush and weeds) and planting and tending permanent crops. Using
the census data, we calculate the average land-specific investment per hectare in
the municfpio by deleting livestock and other mobile agricultural investments
from a broad census investment variable. The agricultural census provides a
combined variable that includes the value of land and investment in buildings,
fences, corrals, equipment, and animals. Since the census provides seperate
data on land value and livestock, we can remove land and livestock values to
get an overall land-specific investment variable.
4
2
Expected returns from investment depend upon livestock and commodity
prices, transportation costs, and land quality. Distance from the market should
reduce the expected returns from investment by raising transportation costs.
For the survey estimations, site dummies with respect to Altamira are used to
control for site-specific differences, such as soil quality, in the private returns to
investment. Distance is given as kilometers from the market center to the farm.
For the census data, distance is distance between the municfpio capital and the
major state market center, Curitiba in Parand and Bele'm in Part. Average soil
quality in the municfpio is included. Although livestock and commodity prices
generally do not vary across municfpios for any census period, transportation
costs are different across the sample. To determine whether investment was
reduced by conflicts in an area, we add dummy variables for those municfpios
in Parand and Pard where conflict occurred and where property rights were
uncertain, even with title. Moreover, private land companies in Parang and IN-
CRA in Para provided some subsidies for permanent crops, fertilizers, and other
infrastructure, which may have raised the net private returns from investment;
we control for these effects with dummy variables for the municfpios involved.
The private costs of investment include the costs of capital plus the costs
of the actual investment Access to and the cost of funds to purchase inputs
for investment depend in part on whether the farmer has title and thus can
use the farm as collateral. Having title also provides more security for long-
term investments. For the survey data, a dummy variable is included to indicate
whether or not the farmer has title. For the census data, title is represented by the
percentage of farmers in a municfpio who hold title. Title should provide greater
security for long-term investment in pasture and permanent crops and assist in
accessing credit. Human capital variables such as age, education, wealth, and
42. Livestock values for 1985 were not provided by the census, but were estimated by multiplying
the number of animals (as given) by estimated prices. The prices were calculated by dividing the
value of sales for each category (as provided in the census) by the number sold. Values for Parana
were converted to 1970 cruzeiros, those for Para to 1985 cruzeiros. The price index used was the
{ndice General de Pre^os calculated by Fundac,ao Getiilio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro. The investment
amount was then divided by the amount of agricultural land in the county, as provided in the census.46 The Journal d Law, Economics, 4 Organization. V12 N1
time on the farm, which are available from the survey, also should raise the
expected returns from investment. Those with greater education should be
more aware of market conditions and how to respond to them. Personal wealth
may increase an individual's ability to obtain additional funds for investment.
Age and time on the farm may reflect greater farming experience.
6. Empirical Results
Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients and r-statistics for the estimations
of Equations (1), (2), and (3) using the survey data. Tables 3 through 5 contain
the results of the estimations made using the census data.
4
3
6.1 Survey Data
Column 2 of Table 2 provides the estimation of Equation (1) for the determinants
of land value using OLS and a log-linear specification. The site dummies in the
equation account for the differences within each region that might affect land
value, such as soil quality. Hence, the intercepts can be different for different
sites. The results indicate that land values are higher at TucumS than at the base
line of Altamira, and soil conditions are known to be relatively good at Tucum5
(Butler, 1985). The estimated values per hectare are $34.12, $148.41, $28.22,
and $21.76 for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix, and Tail§ndia respectively.
4
4 As
predicted, the effect of title on land value is positive and significant. Because we
have controlled for the impact of investment the title variable largely reflects
the gain in value due to increased exchange opportunities and lower private
enforcement costs.
The log specification of the model implies that the percentage increase in land
value due to having title will be the same across all of the sites, holding distance
constant. If distance is zero—that is, the farm is at the market center, where
values and competition for control are potentially the greatest—the estimated
coefficient suggests that title would raise values by 189 percent.
4
5 Similarly,
at a distance of 40 kilometers, land values would be increased by 72 percent.
4
6
This estimated increase in value is consistent with the actual observations. For
instance, for farms in the range of 20 to 39 kilometers from the market, actual
43. We did not pool the census data for two reasons. One was that we wanted to examine
changes across time, which can be best illustrated by comparing the individual census year runs.
Furthermore, there are problems with pooling the Paranfi data in particular, because the number
of municfpios, and hence observations, changes across time from 49 to 288. This increase in the
number of municfpios took place through subdivision of municfpios, so the observation base is not
the same across time. Additionally, for Pari we do not have information on all of the variables
across time. In the estimations for 1970, one record for Parf is lost due to a negative value for
investment, giving 78 observations.
44. The estimated values are drawn directly from the site dummy coefficients: e
3'
3
3 = 34.12,
<r>-«+' « = 148.41, P-Sl-o 19 = 28_22i and ^3-0.45 = 21 76 45. The change in land value is e' ^ — 1, or 189 percent Although the coefficient 1.06 represents
an approximation of the percentage change in the land value due to having title, the magnitude of
the coefficient makes it a less accurate approximation. Accordingly, it is preferable to calculate
directly the percentage change in value due to having title.
46. The change in land value with title is <•'
 06-°
 l4fl
n "'«<"•«) - I, or at 40 km, 72 percent.The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights. Land Titles on the Brazffian Frontier 47
Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Determinants of Land Value, Title, and Investment:
Survey Data for Small Farmers
Variables
Sites
Constant (Altamira)
Tucuma
Sao Felix
Tailandia
Land characteristics
Title
Distance
Title • Distance
Cleared land
Investment
Landholder characteristics
Time
Education
Wealth
Age
Other
Change in value
Calculated log-
likelihood ratio
ft
2
Land Value per Hectare
3.53
(6.00)
1.47
(8.87)
-0.19
(-1.06)
-0.45
(-3.12)
1.06
(2.14)
-0.23
(-1.75)
-0.14
(-1.14)
058
(1.33)
0.97
(2.14)
—
—
—
—
—
—
.69
Title
0 51
(0.82)
-2.28
(-3.32)
0.33
(0.78)
-0.07
(-0.21)
—
-0.006
(-1.74)
—
—
—
0.04
(2 38)
0.08
(1.59)
0.00002
(1.18)
-0.007
(-0.83)
0.01
(1.35)
59.61
Off 05 = 16.92)
Investment
-0.23
(-1.43)
0.22
(4.08)
-0.09
(-2.75)
-0.07
(-2.31)
0.36
(3.50)
0.003
(0.19)
—
—
—
-0.02
(-1.09)
-0.01
(-0.92)
0.01
(2 33)
0.03
(0.95)
—
119.54
Otf. as = 16.92)
Note: /-statistics appear in parentheses.
land values per hectare for titled land are 71 percent higher than those for
nontitled land.
4
7 The regression predicts that at a distance of 140 kilometers,
land values would be 45 percent higher for titled land. Actual observations
for all farms 140 kilometers or more away from market reveal a 35 percent
difference in land value between titled and nontitled land.
Title also affects the slope of the estimated relationship between land value
47. Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1995) have the responses of 14 settlers in Tucuma who
report increases in land value with title that range from 0 percent to 100 percent. All of these
settlers, however, are remote from the market center in TucumiL Hence, a 189 percent increase in
value is conceivable when distances are zero.48 The Journal of Law, Economcs, & Organization, V12N1
and distance. The estimated coefficients for the distance and title-distance
interaction variables indicate that a 1 percent increase in distance from the
market leads to a 0.37 percent decline in the value of titled land.
4
8 The estimated
impact of distance on nontitled land is negative, with a 1 percent increase in
distance reducing land value by 0.23 percent.
As distance from the market center increases, values for titled and nontitled
land fall. The results suggest that, as predicted, the decline in value with distance
is greatest for titled land. Hence, at some point the two estimated relationships
meet. Using the estimated coefficients for title and the title-distance interaction,
we can solve for the distance where values for land with title equal those for
land without title. In the case at hand, the distance is 1,942 kilometers, which
is beyond any of our sampled locations.
4
9 Hence, having title provides some
value to all the small holders in our sample.
Agricultural investment in permanent crops and pasture has the predicted
positive effect on land values: a 1 percent increase in the percentage of farm
land in pasture and permanent crops results in a 0.97 percent increase in value
per hectare. Clearing also has a statistically weak, positive effect on land value:
a 1 percent increase in the percentage of the farm that is cleared yields a 0.58
percent increase in value per hectare.
Column 3 of Table 2 provides the estimation of Equation (2) for title for the
pooled sample with a Probit model, where title is a binary variable, one if the
individual had a definite or provisional title, and zero otherwise.
5
0 The estima-
tion is reasonably accurate as a predictor, correctly predicting the existence of
title in 84 percent of the cases and correctly predicting no title in 53 percent of
the cases.
5
1 The lower prediction success for the absence of title reflects the
aggressive titling practices of the state land agency, ITERPA, in S3o Felix and
TailSndia, where low-valued, remote land claims are granted title for political
reasons.
The regression also tends to overpredict title; that is, we predict a title for 144
settlers while only 127 have title. This result suggests that the government titling
agencies do not exactly follow the process outlined in the analytical framework
in Figure 1. We describe governments as providing title when individual cal-
culations of private net benefit lead claimants to demand formal recognition of
their claims. We recognize, however, that political and bureaucratic factors—
48. This result is obtained by adding the coefficient for the title-distance interaction to the
estimated coefficient for the distance variable, that is, —0.14 + (—0.23) = -0.37.
49. We solve for the distance by setting the two estimated lines equal to each other. Dividing
the estimated coefficient for title by the estimated coefficient for the title-distajice interaction
(1.06/0.14) gives 7.57, ande"
7 = 1,942 km.
50. Some farmers have a provisional title, rather than a final or definitive title. A provisional
title may be issued while final processing of the title application takes place. Based on the survey
of settlers and discussion with land agency officials, we view provisional and definitive titles as
essentially the same, and we treat them as equals in the analysis. When the equation reported here
is estimated using definitive titles only, the results essentially are the same.
51. The regression correctly predicts 42 of 79 farms without title and 107 of 127 with title.
Overall, the regression correctly predicts 149 out of the sample of 206, or 72 percent.The Delenrtnants and Impact at Property Rights Land Tlttes on the Brazlan Fronber 49
such as constituent lobbying, election pressures, budget allocations, and staffing
levels—will affect the government response. How the government responds
will influence the private costs of obtaining title and hence shift the cost curve.
We do not have sufficient information about agency titling to effectively model
the process or to include political variables in the regressions. We attempt
to control for political differences associated with federal and state jurisdic-
tions and land agencies, INCRA or ITERPA, through the site dummy variables.
However, our results indicate that the problem of undertitling claimants who
have comparatively highly valued land close to markets exists across the sites,
at least to some degree. For example, there are plots in both Altamira and
TailSndia that have reasonably high values and are near the market center but
are not titled.
5
2 This problem is most pronounced in the INCRA community of
Tucuma. INCRA's budget and staffing for processing claims have declined as
the federal government has allocated budgets to other national issues (Yokota,
1981: 33; Schneider, 1994: 8). The undertitling in Tucuma is reflected by the
negative intercept, which indicates that settlers in Tucuma are less likely to have
title than are settlers in the baseline site of Altamira or in the ITERPA colonies
of S5o Felix and TailSndia. In the latter two colonies, the probability of having
title does not differ significantly from that found in Altamira, where titling by
INCRA initially was aggressive but now also is lagging (Moran, 1984: 291).
Mean distances from the market are 26 kilometers in Tucuma, 63 kilometers in
Altamira, 153 kilometers in S3o Felix, and 45 kilometers in Tail&ndia. Mean
land values are $237.34 per hectare in Tucuma, $59.66 in Altamira, $16.64 in
S3o Felix, and $24.10 in Tail§ndia.
The undertitling by the federal agency, INCRA, in Tucuma and the over-
titling by the state agency, ITERPA, in S3o Felix is demonstrated further by
the following comparison. Based on the estimated coefficients evaluated at the
means for each site and the cumulative normal density function, the predicted
probability of having title in each area is 89 percent at Altamira, 32 percent at
Tucum5, 59 percent at SSo Felix, and 73 percent at TailSndia. Alternatively, if
settlers with the mean characteristics for each site were located in the baseline
colony of Altamira, then the predicted probability of having title is 96 percent
for Tucuma, only 46 percent for S3o Felix, and 75 percent for Tailindia.
5
3
The role of political and bureaucratic variables in influencing agency response
to demands for title also is indicated in the apparent overtiming in SSo Felix and
Tail§ndia by the state agency ITERPA, whose agents in some cases have handed
out titles prior to local elections. By granting titles in remote locations prior
to election, the agency appears to have lowered the private costs of obtaining
title. However, the social costs of providing title to these low-valued sites may
52. In Altamira, there are at least two plots with reasonably high per hectare land values that
arc only 12 and 13 kilometers from the market, but neither fanner has title. Similarly, in Tail&ndia
there are two plots that have values above the mean price per hectare but are not titled.
53. For the alternative probabilities of having title, each site was estimated as though the settlers
were in Altamira. Following Greene (1993: 696-98), the dummy variables for the sites other than
the baseline were set to zero.50 The Journal of Law, Economic*, & Organization, V12 N1
be quite high, and those costs are not completely internalized by the agency.
5
4
For the human capital variables, only time on the farm makes a statistically
significant contribution to having title, although education comes close. Those
who have been on their claim longer are more likely to understand the re-
quirements of the land agencies and to meet their requirements. For instance,
evaluated at the means, the marginal increase in the probability of having ti-
tle given a one year increase in time on the farm is 0.8 percentage points in
Altamira, 1.6 in Tucuma, 1.7 S3o Felix, and 1.5 in Tail§ndia. Changing the
mean number of years by one-half standard deviation raises the probability of
having title by 4.3 percentage points in Altamira, 2.0 in Tucuma, 4.6 in S3o
Felix and 3.8 in Tailandia.
5
5 Similarly, evaluated at the means, the marginal
increase in the probability of having title given a one year increase in education
is 1.6 percentage points in Altamira, 3.0 in Tucuma, 3.2 in S3o Felix, and 2.8 in
TailSndia. Changing the mean number of years of education by one-half stan-
dard deviation raises the probability of having title by 1.6 percentage points in
Altamira, 4.1 in Tucum3, 2.3 in S5o Felix, and 2.3 in TailSndia.
5
6
Distance has the predicted negative effect on the incidence of title, probably
because it raises the costs of obtaining title. Evaluated at the means, the marginal
effects on the probability of having title given a one kilometer increase in
distance is —0.1 percentage points in Altamira, —0.2 in Tucuma, —0.2 in SSo
Felix, and —0.2 in TailSndia. Changing the mean distance by one-half standard
deviation lowers the probability of having title by 2.7 percentage points in
Altamira, 0.9 in TucumS, 4.2 in SSo Felix and 2.7 in Taila"ndia.
5
7
The expected change in land value from having title has the predicted effect
on the incidence of title, although the significance level is low. The regression
suggests that, evaluated at the means, the marginal increase in the probability
of having title, given a $1 increase in the expected change in value due to title
is 0.2 percentage points in Altamira, 0.3 in Tucuma, 0.4 in S3o Felix and 0.3 in
Tail&ndia. Changing the mean change in value by one-half standard deviation
raises the probability of having title by 1.3 percentage points in Altamira, 5.2
in Tucum5, 0.2 in Sao Felix and 0.8 in TailSndia.
5
8
Column 4 of Table 2 presents the estimation of Equation (3) for agricultural
investment using a Tobit model. The regression shows that investment varies
54. Schmink and Wood (1992: 303) state that ITERPA handed out titles prior to local elections
in 1982 as a means of generating political support. Our field surveyor argues that a similar process
is anticipated in TailSndia: "The settlers that do not have a title are still waiting for ITERPA because
these titles are in process. They told me that they are waiting for election time, when ITERPA
issues titles for political interests" (field survey report of Ricardo Tarifa, May 12,1993).
55. The standard deviations from the mean time on farm for Altamira, Tucuma, Sao Felix, and
Tailandia are, respectively, 10.35, 2.51, 5.38, and 5.13.
56. The standard deviations from the mean years of education for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix,
and TailSndia are, respectively, 2.06, 2.72, 1.39, and 1.68.
57. The standard deviations from the mean distances for Altamira, Tucuma, Sao Felix, and
Tailandia are, respectively, 50.27, 9.00, 37.76, and 28.52.
58. The standard deviations from the mean change in value for Altamira, Tucuma, SSo Felix,
and Tailandia are, respectively, $15.36, $32.05, $1.26, and $5.12.The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights Land Titles on the BrazBan Frontier 51
considerably across the sites. The results suggest that settlers in Tucuma make
greater investments in their land than do those in Altamira. Tucuma has the
shortest mean distance to market for the four sites, and it is a relatively prosper-
ous market town. The existence of title has a positive effect on investment. The
effect of title on the percentage of farm land in pasture and permanent crops
can be estimated, using the mean values for settlers at each of the four sites.
The results suggest that the ownership assurance provided by title provides sup-
port for investment in costly fencing, other pasture development activities, and
cultivation of permanent crops. In Altamira, having title adds 29 percentage
points to the proportion of farm land in pasture and permanent crops. The mean
proportion of land so devoted in Altamira is 25.5 percent. Similarly, in both
Sao Felix and Tailandia, having title raises the share of farm land in pasture
and permanent crops by 21 percentage points; in TucumiL, the increase is 48
percentage points.
5
9 The mean percentage of land in pasture and permanent
crops in those sites is 7.3 percent, 12.1 percent, and 31.6 percent, respectively.
Of those settlers who have pasture, the mean level of fencing is 1,181 meters,
which represents an investment of approximately SSSO.
6
0 Accordingly, title
plays a very important role in promoting investment in land improvements. By
comparison, the human capital characteristics appear to have no impact on the
private returns to investment.
6
1
To summarize, the statistical tests using survey data support the analytical
framework described in Figure 1. Land value per hectare is a positive function
of title. Moreover, distance reduces value differentially for titled and nontitled
land. The contribution of title to land value is greatest at the market center, where
competition and private enforcement costs would otherwise be the highest.
The role of title, however, appears to decline with distance, as competition
for control declines and production and exchange opportunities diminish. The
estimations suggest that for all small holders in the sample, title always offers
some added value. Whether or not it pays a settler to seek title depends upon the
corresponding private costs of obtaining it. Land agencies influence those costs,
with the state agency, ITERPA, appearing to provide title liberally, whereas the
federal agency, INCRA, appears to be very slow in titling in the colony of
Tucuma, where land values are relatively high and distances are comparatively
short ITERPA is as likely to provide title to settlers in its remote colonies as is
INCRA in its showcase and more accessible TransAmazon colony of Altamira.
We find strong empirical support for the notion that formal property rights
to land promote farm-specific investments, which in tum, raise land values
directly.
59. Following Greene (1993: 696-98) and McDonald and Moffit (1980), the effect of having
title on investment was estimated by calculating the cumulative density at the means of each site.
The result was used to scale the estimated coefficients.
60. Our field surveyor, Ricardo Tarifa, reported that 1,000 meters of fence cost approximately
$500, including labor and wire, with poles being provided from the farm.
61. There may be a spurious relationship between investment (pasture) and our wealth measure,
which is value of livestock. Hence, we do not draw strong conclusions about the variable.52 The JoumaJ of Law, Economics, 4 Organization, V12 N1
6.2 Census Data
Tables 3 through 5 report the statistical analyses of the general forces underly-
ing land values, the development of property rights to land, and land-specific
investment across time using census data from the two Brazilian frontier ar-
eas. As noted earlier, the census estimations are performed using OLS, and
a log-linear specification is used for the land value and investment equations.
In general, the estimations perform better for the state of Parang than for Para",
perhaps because of much lower land values in Para and other differences in
frontier settlement between the two states such as the involvement of private
land companies in the settlement of Parana" or the role of the government in
subsidizing settlement in Pard.
6.2.1 Determinants of Land Value. As indicated in Table 3, title and investment
have the predicted positive effects on land value for seven of the eight census
periods in the case of title and for all eight census years for investment; the
estimated coefficient is statistically significant in all periods except 1985 for
Para". For Parana\ title has a significant impact at the 90 percent level or better
in two of the four periods, but the variable never has that statistical punch for
Par<L The impact of title on land value is captured partially by the investment
variable, so the title variable in Equation (1) reflects the gain in value due to
increased exchange opportunities and lower private enforcement costs. These
results are consistent with the survey-based findings for the relationship between
land value and title and investment The effect of title on land value tends to
decline with distance from the market center: there is a negative coefficient
for the title-distance interaction variable for seven of the eight census periods.
The effect is weak, however, particularly for Para". For nontitled land, the effect
of distance is negative as expected for Para" (although not significant), but it
is positive for Parana". The other explanatory variables for land value tend to
have the predicted signs, and generally have greater statistical significance for
Parana^ where the overall regressions explain more of the variance. Greater
population density, reflecting demand for land, leads to higher land values in
at least five of the eight census periods. Municfpios under the jurisdiction of
private land companies in Parana^ at least in 1950 and 1960, and municfpios
under INCRA in Para in 1980 tend to have higher land values, likely due to
greater infrastructure and investment. Confused property rights due to conflict
between the state and federal government in parts of Parand appear to lower
land values, particularly in 1970.
6.2.2 Determinants of Property Rights. With regard to the determinants of pri-
vate property rights to land as reported in Table 4, jurisdictional conflict in
Parand in the western municfpios over whether the federal or state government
had authorization to issue titles reduced the proportion of farmers with title, par-
ticularly in the last three census periods. In Para", however, there is no observed
difference between the proportion of farmers with title in those municfpios
characterized by violent conflict over land from the proportion elsewhere in
the state. INCRA municfpios may have had a smaller percentage of farmsT
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with title than elsewhere, but the census estimations reveal no significant ef-
fect. Recall that in the survey data, the INCRA colony of Altamira in ParS had
extensive titling, whereas the INCRA colony of Tucuma, also in Para, appeared
to be undertitled, given land values and distances to market. In Parana those
municfpios under the jurisdiction of the private land company had a greater
percentage of titled farms only in the 1970 census. As hypothesized, distance
from the market/administrative center tends to reduce the portion of farmers
with title, a finding that is consistent with the notion that administrative costs
rise with remoteness. This result also is consistent with those based on the
survey data. The distance variable is significant at the 95 percent level in four
of the eight census runs. The relationship between farm size and title is mixed
in both states. The estimated coefficient generally is positive, as predicted, but
there is a census period in each state for which the effect is negative and sig-
nificant. We had hypothesized that private enforcement costs would rise with
farm size, thereby increasing the demand for title by large fanners. For the
1980 census in Para, we have socioeconomic measures by municfpio for age,
income, and education. All three have a positive impact, but only age leads to
greater titling at a statistically significant level. Finally, the expected change in
value from having title has a positive effect on the incidence of title in five of
the eight census periods, with the greatest statistical significance in two of the
census periods in Pard. These results are consistent with those found for the
survey data.
6.2.3 Determinants of Agricultural Investment. Table 5 provides the estimates
for agricultural investment per hectare. Having title has the predicted positive
impact in seven of the eight census periods and is statistically significant in six
of those periods. This result underscores the role of title in promoting invest-
ment that is seen in the survey data. With regard to distance from the market,
in the two cases where the coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level, the
effect is to reduce investment. In most cases the variable is not significant, a
result also identified with the survey data. Confused property rights associated
with conflicting government jurisdictions over land in Parana appears to reduce
investment in that state, especially in the 1940 census period. There is a similar
weak effect for violent conflict in Para. The private land development compa-
nies that sold land to farmers in Parana and the federal agency, INCRA, that
established colonies of settlers in Para provided infrastructure and some sub-
sidies for investment, and the positive impacts of these practices are reflected
in the regression results. For example, after its creation in 1971, INCRA pro-
vided a variety of subsidies, including housing, other infrastructure, and seeds
to Amazon settlers in its colonies (Moran, 1981: 79-83). Soil quality plays a
positive and generally significant role in investment in Parana.
6
2
Over time, the factors identified in Equation (3) contributed to the growth
62. As noted earlier, the performance of the soil-quality variable appears to be especially weak,
giving expected results for Parana but negative results for Pars'.T
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in investment in land in Parana (in constant 1970 cruzeiros) from Cr$31 per
hectare in 1940 to Cr$453 in 1970.
6
3 Although the same forces appear to have
been active in Para, the amount of investment in that state is considerably less
than in Parana. For example, in 1980, per hectare investment in Part was Cr$79
(1970 cruzeiros), which was less than one-fifth the level in Parana in 1970.
6
4
6.2.4 Summary of Census Data Results. All in all, the predictions of the theory
outlined in Figure 1 are supported by the empirical evidence drawn from the
censuses between 1940 and 1985. In general, title and/or investment raised
land values on both Brazilian frontiers across time. The independent effect
of title on land value, however, tended to decline with distance from major
market centers in Parana, while the distance effect on the value of titled land
was not significant in Para. In both states, higher costs associated with greater
distance from administrative centers tended to reduce the proportion of farmers
in a municfpio with title, with the strongest results in Parti. Jurisdictional
confusion as to which government had authority to issue titles also lowered
titling on the frontier in Parana. Except for one census period, neither the
private land company in Parana nor the federal agency, INCRA, in Para provided
significantly different titling services from those provided elsewhere in the two
states. The expected change in value from having title also generally had the
predicted positive effect on the incidence of title in both states. As predicted,
in most cases title led to more land-specific investment in both states across the
census periods.
The results regarding the determinants and impact of property rights to land
are similar for both the survey and census data. The revealed relationships
provide empirical support for the analytical framework described in Section 3.
7. Concluding Remarks
There is a growing literature on both the roles played by institutions in eco-
nomic behavior and the determinants of those institutions. In this study, we
have examined the development and impact of the most basic institution for
markets—secure property rights in the form of title to land. We focused on
frontier settlements in Brazil, where property rights to land are being estab-
lished as land values increase. The empirical analysis began with microlevel,
individual observations from sample data from 1992 and 1993, which are ap-
propriate for drawing conclusions about individual behavior. The microlevel
analysis was supplemented with estimations that use aggregate census data with
observations at the municfpio level for early frontiers in the state of Parana be-
tween 1940 and 1970 and for more recent frontiers in the Amazon state of Pard
between 1970 and 1985.
In both cases, the theoretical predictions generally are supported by the em-
pirical analyses based on the two data sets. Most critically, title and investment
63. Brazilian Agricultural Census, Parana (1970: 252). The values reported in the text are total
farm investment in each state as we define it, divided by total farm area.
64. Brazilian Agricultual Census, Parana (1970: 252) and Para (1980: 282).58 The Journal of Law, Economics, SOgancation, V12N1
contribute to land value, and title promotes farm-specific investment. Addi-
tionally, the expected change in value from having title appears to increase the
incidence of title. Although we estimated this variable, the results are consis-
tent with actual survey evidence for a subsample of the group. We asked 14
of the 54 fanners interviewed in Tucum5 to estimate how much of the change
in land value was attributable to having title. Of those 14, 11 replied that title
would raise their land values by at least 20 percent and 8 reported that title
would increase their land values by 50 percent or more (Alston, Libecap, and
Schneider, 1995).
The general consistency of the econometric results for both the survey and
census data sets underscores the robustness of the theoretical predictions about
the role of property rights in influencing investment and raising land values.
Additionally, this case study of Brazilian frontiers provides evidence regarding
the political and economic processes that underlie the demand and supply of
title. These empirical results provide insights into the implications of property
rights for economic behavior and the development of markets. This information
adds to the growing literature on the new institutional economics and to the
literature on economic development.
A basic tenet of the new institutional economics is that property-rights
regimes affect economic behavior. Tenure institutions have the potential to
create wealth by promoting investment, by reducing enforcement costs, and by
extending the gains from trade. As a result, individuals have incentives to orga-
nize collectively for the provision of secure rights to valuable assets. Typically,
these institutions are provided by the state, and political factors will influence
how effectively the state responds to demands for property rights.
To date, there have been few opportunities to examine empirically the demand
for and supply of property rights. This study has provided such an investiga-
tion. It has focused on the factors that affect the demand for title and the
government response to those demands. By and large, the demand variables
have performed as predicted. The political response, however, has not been
consistent. Where government jurisdictions have been confused, as in Parana",
title has been less prevalent. Further, the survey data in Para reveal that titling
agencies for both the federal and state governments do not perform exactly as
the economic framework predicts. Claimants to low-value, remote plots receive
title, especially from ITERPA, prior to elections, whereas claimants to some
more valuable plots near to markets are neglected, often due to budget and staff
limitations. This phenomenon is particularly apparent for the INCRA colony
of TucumS, where land values are high and distances are short, but titling is
limited. Unfortunately, the problem exists elsewhere as well. These results
suggest that researchers must pay special attention to the complex political
and bureaucratic process by which property rights are assigned in studying the
emergence of tenure institutions. Clearly, more work in modeling and testing
hypotheses regarding the provision of property rights is warranted.
These results also are relevant for the development literature. At least in
situations where no durable property structure has existed before (as in the case
of frontiers), governments can increase economic performance and wealth byThe Detemiinanb and Impacl o) Property Rights. Land Titles or the BrazSan Frontier 59
providing clear, secure title. As this study shows, however, the government
response to the demand for property rights will be influenced by a variety of
political factors, including competing constituent pressures, electoral demands,
conflicting agency and government jurisdictions, and fluctuating budgets and
staffing for titling agencies. All of these can have important consequences
for the provision of rights institutions, and hence for the path and success of
economic development programs.
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